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Prelude 
 
The guiding theme that has given impetus to the federal government’s 
continued involvement in issues of accreditation has been that the government 
has sought to increase its control of higher education through accreditation.  As 
Pedersen (2005) surmises, “…the federal government has chosen to use the 
regional associations as a "Trojan horse" to exert greater influence on 
accreditation.”  However, if representatives of Department of Education are 
asked, they will claim that the department has been motivated by an honest 
desire to ensure that the public is not misled by false claims of quality and value 
made by colleges and universities.  On the contrary, most colleges and 
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universities would disagree, claiming that the government has been simply 
attempting to use accreditation to force higher education to adopt policies and 
practices that advance a political ideology. 
 
       
Introduction 
This work highlights how politics and philosophical ideology becomes 
innately linked to higher education whenever the government subjects the 
accrediting community to its ideological philosophy. While many believed that the 
actions of Secretary Spellings were new encroachments on the accrediting 
community, the authors’ body of work traced a consistent pattern of how the 
federal government has chosen to use the regional associations as a “Trojan 
horse” to exert greater influence on higher education.  According to Bolman and 
Deal (p. 185, 2003), “In traditional structural views, organizations are guided by 
goals and policies set at the top.” The government is no exception. In tracing the 
government’s role in accreditation, a profusion of contradictory goals and policies 
have been uncovered. Some emerged from a desire to win the hearts and minds 
of society, as in President Truman’s populist promotion of vocational schools and 
community colleges. Others developed as a result of political ideology like the 
1980s rise of the conservative movement. Yet, many emerged as a result of the 
government’s desire to control accreditation, like in its attempted takeover in the 
1992 amendments of the Higher Education Act of 1965.   
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Once again, another Bush Administration, through the Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education, called for scrapping the current system of 
accreditation, in favor of a National Accreditation Foundation that was to be 
created by Congress and the President (Dillon, S., April 12, 2006).  At a 
symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Charles Miller, the 
former Spellings Commission chairman, called for an alternative to accreditation 
in which investors or others interested in creating new forms of higher education 
would gain the ability to operate (and award federal financial aid) “prospectively,” 
rather than having to wait years to gain an accreditor’s imprimatur (Lederman, 
September 24, 2007). 
“For every old idea, a new one is created which conflicts with it. Out of the 
struggle, a new idea is created, (Hegel).” 
What pernicious philosophy to believe that accreditation, the American 
system for maintaining standards in higher education (Seldon, 1960), should be 
scrapped and replaced by a national government system, or even worse, as 
Chairman Miller suggests, an alternative form of accountability system 
administered by investors or others interested in creating new forms of higher 
education.  Why not? Let’s have a higher education system for maintaining 
standards that’s manipulated by investors and driven by the volatility of the stock 
market.  Although the topic was far from front and center in the commission’s 
report, the Education Department had put changes in accreditation at the fulcrum 
of its campaign to force higher education institutions to be more accountable to 
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the public (Lederman, September 24, 2006).  It was quite unfortunate that the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education sought to take out it rage for the 
Republican loss of the 2006 mid-term elections on accreditation.  Had the 
Republicans retained control of Congress, the national discourse on the future of 
higher education would have been quite different, and all stakeholders would be 
meticulously in quest of solutions for the problem of access; cost and 
affordability; a broken financial aid system; evidence-based learning; 
transparency and accountability; and innovation in all aspects of post-secondary 
education.   
In her issue paper, “Assuring Quality in Higher Education—
Recommendations for Improving Accreditation,” Vickie Schray proposed that the 
Secretary of Education create a National Accreditation Working Group, with 
broad involvement of all major accreditation stakeholders, to develop a national 
blueprint for transforming accreditation (Schray, 2006).  Ms. Schray continues the 
federalization theme by proposing that the governance of the National 
Recognition Process adopt standards used by the Department to recognize 
accreditation organizations; and that the current peer review system be replaced 
with formally trained and certified independent reviewers that are experts in the 
application of national accreditation standards.   This is where the Post-Modernist 
begs the question: “Who has the right to change whom, and with what 
responsibility?”  In his issue paper, on behalf of Chairman Charles Miller, Robert 
C. Dickerson described accreditation of higher education in the United States as 
a crazy-quilt of activities, processes and structures that is fragmented, arcane, 
 Closing the Loop on Regulatory Authority vs. Institutional Autonomy in an Age of Accountability“  Charles & Simmons, 2008  Page 5 
 
and more historical than logical, which had outlived its usefulness (Dickerson, 
2006).  In his paper, Dickerson’s proposed the creation of a new organization, in 
which the Congress and the President enact legislation to create The National 
Accreditation Foundation, operating with new standards and processes.  But like 
most of the Issue Papers written on behalf of the Commission, this one also lacks 
specifics.  It was irresponsible to deface the existing system of maintaining 
standards in higher education, and not put forth specific measures and 
governance structures for replacing accreditation.  In short Dickerson was 
proposing the Federalization of accreditation.   
 
The federalization of accreditation was certainly not a new concept – we 
have been here before.  It was during the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA 
provisions that higher education leaders last witnessed the government’s might, 
and its most punitive attack on the institutional autonomy of accreditation. In the 
midst of debate on the reauthorization of this 1992 Higher Education Act that 
Congress’ hostility reached a crisis stage, threatening to bring to a close the role 
of accrediting agencies as gatekeepers for federal financial aid (Bloland, 2001).  
Congress was particularly concerned about the public accountability of 
institutions whose graduates had high student loan default rates. As such, 
Congress held accrediting agencies responsible for this state of affairs, 
especially the regional accrediting bodies that had gate keeping functions with 
regards to Title IV funds for student loans (Altmaire, 2002).  Subpart 1 of Part H 
of the 1992 Higher Education Act amendments empowered the states in 
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determining the eligibility of institutions to participate in the student financial aid 
programs of Title IV (Bloland).  Congress consequently authorized the Secretary 
of Education to designate one State Postsecondary Review Entity (SPREs) in 
each State to be responsible for the conduct and coordination of the review of 
institutions of higher education for the purposes of determining eligibility under 
Title IV (United States Statutes at Large, 1992).  
Subpart 1 of Part H of the 1992 Higher Education Act amendments was 
quite damaging to accrediting.  No accrediting agency or association was to be 
regarded by the Secretary to be a reliable authority as to the quality of education 
or training offered for the purposes of this Act or for other Federal purposes, 
unless the agency or association met standards established by the Secretary 
(United States Statutes at Large, 1992).  Additionally, Subpart 1 of Part H of the 
1992 Higher Education Act amendments outlined the standards and procedures 
to be used by the United States Department of Education (USDE) secretary to 
certify eligibility of institutions for Title IV funding, and gave authority to the 
secretary to set up a master database of accreditation, eligibility, and certification 
(Bloland, 2001).  In the 1992 amendments, the Secretary of the Department of 
Education essentially functioned much like the Minister of Education in a 
centralized national education system like the British. The Secretary was the 
ultimate national authority for quality and accountability in higher education. As in 
the European system, the Secretary acted as a unitary authority accountable 
only to a head of state.  In addition to accrediting duties, the SPREs were 
charged with monitoring federal student aid programs, assessing outcomes, and 
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uncovering illegal and fraudulent activities. Any, or a combination of these 
infractions, were considered by the Secretary to be “triggers” that indicated that 
an institution needed be immediately review for fraudulent activities against the 
federal government’s financial aid programs.  Title IV, “Part H—Program Integrity 
Triad,” was called the flagship Statute of the 1992 Reauthorization of the 1965 
Higher Education Act. 
SPREs would have not gotten anywhere had it not been for at least two 
extremely egocentric persons who were spearheading it from the States 
Agencies.  The true authors of SPREs were David Longanecker, then Chairman 
of the State Higher Education Executives Organization (SHEEO) and Don Nolan, 
Former Deputy Commissioner of Higher Education, Board of Regents, and New 
York State Department of Education. They believed that they could have done a 
better job than the regional accreditation agencies. Mr. Longanecker noted that 
most private colleges have no qualms about accepting billions of dollars a year in 
federal student aid, and as such we have a responsibility to taxpayers to have 
some system of accountability (Jaschik, May 26, 1995).  However, due to a lack 
of available funding to transform accreditation into a government entity, the 1998 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act eliminated language authorizing 
State Postsecondary Review Entities, which were written into the law in 1992 to 
oversee postsecondary institutions (Stephen, 1998).  College officials praised 
lawmakers for acting against the new investigative units. "This is very important, 
because the SPREs brought a level of federal involvement with institutional 
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decisions that we think is inappropriate," said Gordon A. Haaland, president of 
Gettysburg College (Jaschik, May 26, 1995). 
 
Have we not learnt from the past?  There is no greater example of the 
government’s failure to federalize accreditation like the ascend and crash of 
SPREs.  So here were the central questions to for the contemporary architects 
who were attempting to federalize accreditation: If the government did not rely on 
accrediting bodies what would happen?  In the absence of the regional and 
specialized agencies, what would the government put in place as the American 
system for maintaining standards in higher education?  Do we adopt a British-
style centralized government higher education system, like the one being 
recommended by Sir Michael in which states send government and inspectors 
directly into schools to search for causes of poor performance, review school 
leadership, and suggest changes (Dillon, August 15, 2007)?  Or is the solution 
the establishments of a federal bureaucracy like that which was proposed by the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education – the National Accreditation 
Foundation?   
 
Even in the face of such historical precedent, the Department of Education 
attempted to muscle the accreditation community -- through a series of illegal 
negotiated rule-making, intended to use accreditation bodies -- to carry out some 
of the recommendations from the Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
August, 2006 report (Bollag, February, 2007).  The Department of Education 
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actions were illegal because, negotiated rule-making only occurs after the 
Congress legislates the Reauthorization of the 1965 Higher Education Act.  In 
response to a barrage of criticisms, Vickie Schray, a senior department official 
who was leading the negotiations, said, “We felt it was worthwhile to see what 
could be done under current statutory authority (Bollag).” Translation:  after 
reluctantly accepting defeat that a National Accreditation System was impossible, 
the Department of Education wanted to use accreditation to federalize the 
recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Higher Education before 
the Bush Administration’s term runs out.  When the Department of Education was 
conducting the three negreg sessions, their whole objective was to federalize 
accreditation, and take the responsibility for making decisions on quality and 
accountability, away from institutions, through accreditation agencies, and put it 
in the hands of the federal government.  Remember, there was no Higher 
Education Amendments to guide the actions of the Secretary Spelling’s negreg 
sessions.  For that reason they had no legal standing, because the Legislative 
Branch has not reauthorized the 1965 Higher Education Act as yet. 
In late May, 2007, just days before the rule-making process on 
accreditation was to conclude, Senator Lamar Alexander, Republican of 
Tennessee, former secretary of education and ranking minority member on the 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, accused the Bush 
administration of “proposing to restrict autonomy, choice and competition.” 
Alexander wrote to Secretary Spellings, telling her to leave these thorny issues to 
Congress.  The Secretary promptly complied (Traub, September 30, 2007).  
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There is no dispute that serious challenges face American Higher 
Education.  According to Measuring Up 2006, the United States is 7th in the 
world (behind Canada, Japan, Korea, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), in 
educational attainment of young adults (ages 25-34), and 14th internationally in 
college completion (Measuring Up 2006).  However, the questions at hand were: 
“Who was best positioned to set standards for what students should learn, and 
who should establish minimum levels to measure student performance, and 
achievement – Colleges, accrediting bodies, or the government?  Accreditation 
agencies responded resoundingly by siding with Dr. Eaton, that the Colleges, 
rather that the government or accrediting bodies, need to place greater emphasis 
on student-learning outcomes, and only the Colleges should decide the criteria 
for measuring those outcomes (Basken, April, 2007).  The institution is the only 
entity that is in a position to deal with this issue of quality -- whether you’re 
determining program outcomes, institutional effectiveness, student learning 
outcomes, student achievement, it’s the institution, and not the accrediting 
bodies. The accreditation agencies are just there to assure quality – to make 
sure that the institutions have protocol standards in place so that a judgments 
about the extent to which institutions are meeting the requirements are assessed. 
 
In tracing the government’s role in accreditation, a profusion of 
contradictory goals and policies have been uncovered. Even though the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education’s own report recommended that, 
 Closing the Loop on Regulatory Authority vs. Institutional Autonomy in an Age of Accountability“  Charles & Simmons, 2008  Page 11 
 
“Postsecondary education institutions should measure and report meaningful 
student learning outcomes,” the Department of Education spent months rule-
making -- attempting to force accreditation bodies to carryout the Commission’s 
recommendations. Albeit, the Commission explicitly recommends that faculty 
must be at the forefront of defining educational objectives for students, and, 
developing meaningful, evidence-based measures of their progress toward those 
goals. Notwithstanding, higher education institutions should measure student 
learning using quality-assessment data from instruments which measures the 
growth of student learning taking place in colleges (Commission, September, 
2006). To the contrary, the Department of Education actions, -- and at times, 
hegemonic ideologies -- transformed the discussion on the future of higher 
education, into a discourse of regulatory authority versus institutional autonomy.  
We must return the discussion on the future of higher education in American 
Colleges and Universities to one of voluntary accountability. 
“For every old idea, a new one is created which conflicts with it. Out of the 
struggle, a new idea is created, (Hegel).” 
Secretary Spelling’s unsuccessful negreg sessions exerted painstaking 
pressure that was intended to force the accreditation bodies to use its authority 
on Colleges to have campuses become transparent and show performance 
evidence that they are educating their students based on measurable outcomes. 
The government’s focus should have been on the Colleges, and not the 
accrediting bodies. However, out of the struggle of the negreg sessions emerged 
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a new idea to create a voluntary system of accountability (VSA), in which the 
institutions would collect and make public a broad range of information about 
their performance (Lederman April 10, 2006). VSA is the brain-child of the 
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities. 
Responding to the challenges of the Spellings’ Commission for “a robust 
culture of accountability and transparency throughout higher education” (U. S. 
Department of Education, 2006, p. 21), the American Association of State 
Colleges and Universities (AASCU) and the National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) are engaged in a joint effort to 
develop a voluntary system of accountability, a project aiming to make the public 
get access to the broad information about institutions, ranging from accurate 
tuition costs to institutional performance in meeting core learning outcomes 
(Jones, 2007). According to AASCU (2007b), over the course of the next year, 
AASCU and NASULGC, with funding assistance from The Lumina Foundation for 
Education, will engage their members in the development of the system with the 
purpose of widely adopting it. 
 
Task Forces Developing VSA 
AASCU and NASULGC have formed seven task forces that address 
different issues respectively when implementing the VSA project (AASCU, 
2007a, 2007b). Situated in a leading position, the Presidential Advisory 
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Committee is charged with providing guidance to the task forces and work 
groups.  
The System Design and Information Task Force is in charge of exploring 
overall questions about the VSA; while the Student and Family Information Task 
Force is charged to answer, “What information would be most helpful to 
prospective students and their parents in deciding which university best fits their 
educational wants and needs”, and to address information related to costs of 
attendance, retention of students and graduation rate outcomes. The Campus 
Engagement Task Force is responsible for identifying instruments that 
comprehensively measure student engagement with the campus as well as the 
methods used to report those instruments and gather information for those 
instruments. The Core Educational Outcomes Task Force will focus on how the 
academy can develop useful and credible performance indicators for student 
learning outcomes and student growth outcomes. 
In addition, two technical work groups will be affiliated with the Core 
Educational Outcomes Task Force to assist its work. One is Technical Work 
Group on Learning Outcomes, which centers on identifying a small number of 
educational outcome assessment instruments with the intent of facilitating 
comparison. The other is Technical Work Group on Student Growth Outcomes, 
which focuses on developing a list of student growth domains that institutions 
should assess and demonstrate value added, and take into account items of 
psychosocial change, attitudes and values, moral development and use of 
reflective judgment. 
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Advantages of VSA 
According to Carey (2007), “Humans are fallible; they work harder and 
better if they know someone else is paying attention to how well they do. The 
same is true for institutions (p. 26). And the federal government policies the 
activities of institutions in student financial aid, and that’s very important because 
there is a lot of money involved and there can be fraud (Fusco, 2005). This 
sentiment was recently echoed by Dr. Kirwan, Chancellor, University System of 
Maryland, “Before asking people to pay a large amount of money, higher 
education institutions have the responsibility for giving “them the information they 
need to make an informed, educated choice by providing clear, concise, 
relatively standardized data that can be compared across institutions” (2007, p. 
23-24). By making institutional performance data availability and transparent to 
the public, all stakeholders will be better equipped to make data-driven decisions 
about the performance of postsecondary institutions. The VSA initiative is 
intended to enable prospective students and their families to understand the 
details of individual institutions by having access to a trustworthy source of 
standard data.  
This Voluntary System of Accountability promises to put in place policies 
and procedures that can strengthen the mutual, cooperative relationships 
between higher learning institutions and the legislators and other policy makers 
by providing for transparent and comparable data that they have been calling for. 
“Until higher education is more transparently and strongly accountable”, it will 
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neither “be able to compete for public support with Medicaid, K-12 education, and 
public safety”, nor will “be able to convince policymakers to fund student 
financial-aid programs at levels that match rapidly rising college costs…” (Carey, 
2007, p. 29). 
A Voluntary System of Accountability will engage all faculty and staff, and 
consequently empower them to build a better understanding of their institution on 
a broad scale. Data on such issues like student engagement and learning 
outcomes will “allow faculty and staff to gain additional knowledge on student 
learning and student development at their institution”, and resultantly, “determine 
whether curricular or other change is needed to improve the ability of their 
students to succeed as employees or in graduate studies” (“The Voluntary 
System”, 2007, P. 8-9). Although VSA outlines a structure for Colleges to follow, 
many contemporary University leaders have begun to put systems in place that 
will streamline data-driven decision making for improving their institution’s 
performance. When Dr. Todd became President of the University of Kentucky, 
his first action was to devise a system for rating state universities which involved 
measuring indicators like graduation rates; the academic quality of entering 
students; the number of Ph.D.’s being produced; the scholarly citations and 
awards amassed by the faculty members; and the dollar value of federal 
research grants awarded to the faculty members. Then, they designated 
Benchmarks were then designed to measure the University’s progress. 
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Disadvantages of VSA 
According to David Eubanks, Director of Planning, Assessment, and 
Information Services at Coker College, “a national metric for comparing 
institutions based on a standardized test like the Collegiate Learning Assessment 
(CLA) would be a disaster, except for the test publishers” (2006). He indicated 
that huge incentives would be created to improve the test scores by all means, 
leading to coaching, faking, and invalidating the scores. Similarly, Pascarella and 
Terenzini concluded “simple displays based on institutional averages can be 
misleading if used by prospective students to pick the right school”, holding that 
“individual student performance typically varies much more within institutions 
than average performance does between institutions” (as cited in Kuh, 2007, p. 
32). The number of the institutions that will participate may have a negative 
impact on the effectiveness of the VSA. According to Morse (2007), “only a small 
proportion of four-year colleges will most likely to participate” since the system is 
voluntary by definition. Outcomes from the National Survey of Student 
Engagement, and the Collegiate Learning Assessment should not be used as a 
“one size fit all” national metric for comparing postsecondary institutions. The 
performance indicators of higher education institutions are much more complex 
than purchasing an automobile. 
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Summary 
The responsibility to provide students with the highest quality of education 
possible is the prevailing concern for colleges and universities. To its credit, the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education government addressed these 
shortcomings that have taken place in our higher education institutions. However, 
due to a perceived lack of action by the institutions, and accrediting agencies, the 
federal government wants to enact accountability and performance measures to 
make sure that Colleges and Universities focus more on outputs that promote 
student success.  Nevertheless, because of personal desires for promotion of 
political ideologies, and even basic power struggles, the government’s 
involvement in accreditation has proven to be a conflict of interest. Though the 
governments’ intentions for accreditation and higher education may appear to be 
noble, the evidence of their actions to exert influence and ultimately federalize 
accreditation has been the outcome. 
 
The federal government’s involvement in accreditation post the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education report is maligned with 
contradictions in their goals and policies which ultimately come from their innate 
nature as politicians to placate and please society. As such, authorities tried to 
come up with replacements for accreditation utilizing the government, but these 
replacements lack specifics, and all in all lead to a federalization of accreditation.  
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Accreditation has long been under attack by the government, and with each 
attack, there have been failures in the system along with injustices. With 
intimidation and strong-arming, the government has chosen to threaten the 
significance of the accreditation community, and has even recommended that 
higher learning institutions be placed under the control of a politically driven 
machines, to be managed by result driven investors.  
 
In light of these governmental regulatory challenges which have continued 
to encroach upon the autonomy of institutions and accreditation agencies, higher 
education leaders must assert greater control. The institution is the only one in 
position to deal with this issue of quality, not accreditation agencies. These 
agencies should only ensure quality, and enforce protocols and standards. 
Autonomy, consistent with mission, must be the domain of the institutions. 
 
Consistent with Hegel’s theory of change, the Voluntary System of 
Accountability (VSA) has been one of the compromises in dealing with the 
federal government’s involvement in assessing student learning outcomes. In this 
system, institutions would collect and make a public, a broad range of information 
about their performance. The system would intact task forces to address 
pertinent information such as; what information is most helpful to prospective 
parents and students in deciding which university best fits their educational wants 
and needs, assessment and facilitating, comparisons, student growth domains. 
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According to Kirwan (2007), the nation “has entered a new era of public 
accountability”, in which higher education receives a significant amount of 
taxpayer support and sizable funding from the students as well due to the rising 
operation costs and fees (p. 22). Under such circumstances, the VSA intends to 
provide the public with comparable information on higher education institutions 
by using a common format. So the system “gets credit for being the only such 
effort underway that will include outcomes and assessment data” (Morse, 2007). 
 
As all stakeholders move to enacting this omnibus 2008 Reauthorization 
of the 1965 Higher Education Act, it is important that governmental agencies do 
not lose sight of the true goal of their efforts. In the struggle for power and 
respect it is easy to forget the ones the fight is being fought for. The students are 
the most important entity in this struggle for control and influence, and there 
needs to be consistent and effective evaluations of their institutions to ensure 
that they are being provided with the tools to make them achieve to the level at 
which they are capable.  Accrediting agencies have a track record of evaluating 
evidence.   
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